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DEATH, THE STATE, AND THE INSANE:
STAY OF EXECUTIONt
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.*
and David W. Louisell **
By the law of all common law jurisdictions, and, as far as we
know, the law of all civilized nations, a person who is insane cannot be punished. This rule is well established, and its soundness
in logic and policy is beyond the scope of the inquiry here. But
the procedure for determining whether a prisoner is indeed insane
presents troublesome problems. The purpose of this paper is to
review the present procedure by which this determination is made
and to explore the necessity for its change. Reference will be made
chiefly to the law of California, but the problems posed under California law are representative of those arising generally.
I.

THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE RULE

EXEMPTING THE INSANE FROM PUNISHMENT

It is familiar that mental illness in certain circumstances relieves an accused from criminal responsibility.' Speaking very generally, the rationale of this rule is that imposition of criminal sanctions is not justified if the person against whom they would be
applied was incapable of responsible action. It is also familiar that
if a defendant is disabled by mental illness during the proceedings
jThis article is based upon a study made at the request of the California Law
Revision Commission and pursuant to contract between it and Professor David
W. Louisell. Its title is: "A study to determine whether the law respecting
post-conviction sanity hearings should be revised." The opinions, conclusions,
and recommendations are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent or reflect the opinions, conclusions, and recommendations of the Law
Revision Commission.
*Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
**Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
See generally, MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 4.01-4.10 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955);

id. pp. 156-201. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 26, 1016, 1026; Montapert,
Restatement of the Law of Insanity as a Defense in the Criminal Law of
California,27 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 181 (1954).
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against him, the proceedings are abated.2 The rationale of this rule
is that a defendant should not be put to trial when his mental condition prevents him from making an effective defense. The law,
however, recognizes mental condition or "insanity" as affecting
criminal liability in a third way, namely, by providing that a
defendant who is insane may not be punished. As will be seen presently, the rationale of this rule is far from clear.
The second and third rules regarding insanity are stated in
California Penal Code section 1367, as follows: "A person cannot
be tried, adjudged to punishment, or punished for a public offense,
while he is insane."
The statute appears to be broader than the common law rule.
At common law no person could be executed who was insane; but
the common law rule made no mention of prison sentences.3 In
point of fact, the statutory broadening of the exemption rule seems
to have little practical effect because the claim of insanity is almost4
always asserted by defendants who have been sentenced to death.
Apparently the terrors of bedlam exceed those of prison, though not
those of hell. Indeed, so uniform is this experience that for practical purposes we can think of the rule in its common law form as
an exemption from capital punishment.
Both the common law and the statute provide an exemption
which lasts only as long as the convict remains insane. Once he
2

See, MODEL

PENAL CODE §§

4.04-4.07 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); id. pp.

194-195.

s
4

The rule applies whether the defendent was insane at the time of the
offense and remained insane up to the time when he was brought to trial,
or was sane at the time of the offense but became insane prior to his trial.
The test applied in California to determine whether the defendent should
stand trial is whether he is "capable of understanding the nature and object
of the proceedings against him and can conduct his defense in a rational
manner." People v. Perry, 14 Cal.2d 387, 399, 94 P.2d 559, 565 (1939); People
v. Field, 108 Cal. App.2d 496, 238 P.2d 1052 (1951). A substantially identical test is used elsewhere, Annot., 3 A.L.R. 94 (1919), and is proposed in
MODL PENAL CODE § 4.04 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). "No person who as a
result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted
or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such in capacity endures." Ibid.
See WEIHoFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 464 (1954).
This of course does not imply that prison wardens typically escape the necessity of providing for the insane other than those under sentence of death.
But apparently the initiative for transfer from prison to mental institutions
rarely is exercised by prisoners under sentences for life or years, or those
acting on their behalf. The problem is rather one of the necessities of prison
administration, with the initiative being exercised by the warden. In other
words, among insane prisoners as among the insane generally, the impulse
for self-commitment is a relatively rare phenomenon. The Medical Facility
at Vacaville under the Department of Corrections is the California institution
designed to accommodate the transfer of insane prisoners from other institutions. See CAL. PE.

CODE

§§ 6100-06.
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regains his sanity he again becomes subject to punishment and normal routine calls for setting a new execution date.5 Therefore, in
the determination both of post-conviction insanity and restoration
to sanity, there is at stake the ultimate issue of life and death, and
the pressure imposed on the procedural structure is accordingly at
the extremity. Such, then, is the scope of the rule exempting an
insane prisoner from punishment.
When we seek the purpose of the rule we are met with diverse
explanations of varying persuasiveness. The very multiplicity of
explanations suggest that the rule may have been devised to meet
an earlier theoretical or practical need or social consensus and has
survived the obsolescence of the originating cause. It is nevertheless necessary to explore the purpose of the exemption, for only
when its importance is correctly gauged can we decide what degree
of procedural thoroughness should accompany application of the rule.
The traditional explanations of the rule are found in the writings of the old common law commentators. These sources are conveniently collected in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion
in Solesbee v. Balkcom.7 No other explanations seem to have been
offered by criminal law writers. Blackstone and Hale explained
the rule by saying that if the defendant is sane he might urge some
reason why the sentence should not be carried out." Although there
may be some substance to this suggestion, it does not seem weighty.
The same reasoning would be sufficient to postpone - perhaps indefinitely -the execution of a sane man, for if it be assumed that
intelligent reflection will disclose reasons for stay of execution, then
time for reflection should be allowed the sane as well. It must be
remembered that, by hypothesis, the defendant is assertedly insane
at the time scheduled for execution but has been sane throughout
the proceedings against him up to and including the pronouncement
of sentence. Thus, the only justification for allowing a postponeSee In re Phyle, 30 Cal.2d 838, 186 P.2d 134 (1947); Wwno1pN, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 468-69.
6 Compare HOLMES, THE CoMMON LAw 5 (1881). "A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the student of history, is this. The customs,
beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In the
course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule
remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and
ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some
ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile
it with the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new
reasons which have been found for it, and enters on a new career." Ibid.
7
339 U.S. 9, 17-19 (1950). This is the leading case on the constitutional requirements for the procedure by which the exemption rule is applied. It is
discussed below in that connection.
8 4 BLACKSTODTE. COMMENTARIES 395*-96* (13th ed. 1800); 1 HALE, PLEAs Op
THE CROWN 34-35 (1736).
5
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ment of execution because insanity then supervenes is to suppose
that a reason not previously considered will suddenly come to mind
-a possibility which seems so small as to be more argumentative
than persuasive. While it is perhaps impossible to characterize any
factor as de minimis when set against human life, the reality of
this explanation for the rule is dubiousY
Blackstone offered an additional reason for the rule, namely
that the prisoner's insanity is itself sufficient punishment. 10 This
is a completely untenable basis for the exemption rule since, by the
rule's own terms, when the insanity is cured the prisoner-far from
having served out his punishment-is forthwith taken to the execution chamber.
Coke offered a different explanation for the rule. He stated
that the rule is one of humanity, a refusal to take the life of the
unfortunate prisoner." Coke's theory may be interpreted as stopping at this point and going no further, a notion which seems to
underlie all modern defenses of the exemption rule. Taken in this
form, however, the explanation will not survive analysis. On the
contrary, it is nothing less than an oblique attack on the death penalty itself, for most of the objections to executing an insane man
are the same as, but less persuasive than, the objections to executing
a sane man. As Mr. Justice Traynor put it:
Is it not an inverted humanitarianism that deplores as barbarous the
capital punishment of those who have become insane after trial and
conviction, but accepts the capital punishment for sane men, a curious
reasoning that would free a man from capital punishment only if he
is not in full possession of his senses? 12

However, Coke's theory seems to have a further implication
than merely the objection to taking human life. Coke has it that
taking the human life of an insane person does not serve as an
example to others.'3 Just what Coke meant by this is not completely clear, but one cogent explanation is suggested by Sir John
Hawles when he says that the King is not benefited by the death of
one of his subjects unless that death serves to deter others from com9 See Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal.2d 144, 158, 208 P.2d 668, 674 (1949) (Traynor,
10

11
12

J., concurring).
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 395*-96* (13 ed. 1800). The notion is frequently expressed in the Latin, "furiosus solo furore punitur." The same
maxim appears in Coke's work.
CoKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 6 (1797).

Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal.2d 144, 159, 208 P.2d 668, 676-77 (1949) (concur-

ring opinion). It seems worth noting that Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who has
been an insistent advocate of a right to hearing on the claim of insanity, is
opposed to capital punishment itself. See FRANKFURTER, OF LAWS AND MEN
77, 81 (1956).
13 Coke expresses it in the Latin, "ut poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat." COKE, THRDw INSTITUTE 6 (1797).
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mitting the same crime. 14 In other words, Coke can be taken as

suggesting that there is no deterrent value in executing the insane
person so that his life may be spared without weakening the deterrent effect of the death penalty.
This explanation closely resembles the rationale underlying the
imposition of lesser penalties on attempts than on offenses successfully completed.15 First, the public, though angered by the prisoner's crime, takes pity on his present insane condition and hence
probably will not tolerate executing him."' Since penal sanctions
cannot far outrun public opinion, this is a major consideration supporting the rule. Secondly, the offender cannot, at the time he is
about to commit the crime, foresee that after capture, conviction
and sentence, he will became insane. On the contrary, he either
supposes he will not be caught or is indifferent to the consequences
if he is. Hence, it does not materially dilute the deterrent effect of
the death penalty to withhold it if the prisoner becomes insane.
Since there is no deterrent effect in executing him, life would be
taken unnecessarily.
This basis for the rule is satisfactory as long as we suppose
that the defendant becomes permanently insane, but such is not
always the case and, indeed, may be the exception. Rather, there
remains the possibility that recovery will follow, and when it does,
so follows the execution. It may be that the only sound reason for
imposing death at this point is to assure that insanity will not be
feigned in the first place. It might also be said that the restoration
of the prisoner to sanity also restores him to a status such that his
execution has the same deterrent effect as if he had been sane
throughout. This latter reason appears to be at least partially un14

Sir John Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 STATE
474, 478 (Howell ed. 1816), partially set forth in Solesbee v. Balkcorn, 339 U.S. 9 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.).
See Michael and Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (pts. 1-2),
37 COLUM. L. REv. 701, 1261 (1937). "In the first place, popular indignation
is inevitably aroused by the actual occurrence of a wrong, with the result that
death and other very severe penalties are more likely to be tolerated when
homicide behavior has resulted fatally than when it has not. In the second
place, the deterrent efficacy of a body of criminal law is not greatly lessened
by making the discrimination. Men who may act in order to kill will hope
for and contemplate success rather than failure. Consequently, if the prospect of being punished severely if they succeed will not deter them from
acting, the prospect of being punished just as severely if they fail is unlikely
TRIALS

15

to do so....
However, . . . discriminations of this sort . . . make for inequality in the treatment of offenders ....
[but this] inequality may ...

14

be preferable to an unnecessary sacrifice of actual offenders for the sake of
deterrence." Id. at 1295, 1297; cf. Model Penal Code Tent. pp. 178-79 (Tent.
Draft No. 10, 1960).
This may well be an "inverted" humanitarianism, as Justice Traynor says,
but it still seems to be a correct statement of public sentiment.
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satisfactory, however, because the perceived irony of execution upon
restoration to sanity would seem to vitiate the impact of the execution itself. In any event, the fact that many who become insane
will recover and all who recover will be executed means that the
rule has only a limited effect to avoid unnecessary deaths. Viewed
in this light, the rule exempting the insane from capital punishment - like the rule that attempted crimes are to be punished less
severely than completed offenses - does not rest, as does the rule
requiring sanity at trial, on any claim to fair process put forth on
behalf of the prisoner. The reason for withholding the ultimate
sanction from the insane prisoner is that his execution is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the end of deterrence. 1 So considered, the rule of exemption does not necessarily carry with it a demand that it be accurately and fully applied to every prisoner claiming its benefit. The purpose of the inquiry is not to make sure that
a defendant's right is vindicated, for no right of his is involved. The
inquiry need only satisfy society that it is not overlooking an opportunity to withhold the death penalty.s
There is another basis on which the exemption rule is traditionally explained, and that assumes retribution to be one objective
of punishment. In this connection, "retribution" does not mean
vengeance. Although the desire for vengeance doubtless does much
to explain why the death penalty exists, it is immaterial for vengeance whether the defendant is sane or not; the important thing
is to exterminate the wrongdoer. But "retribution" is frequently
used in a sense different from vengeance, and when so used it is
relevant to the exemption rule. This is the theory that each wrong
17

18

Stated this way, the rationale for withholding the death penalty from an
insane prisoner appears to imply the callous if not blood-thirsty use of the
prisoner's life as a means to the achievement of society's general purpose to
deter serious crime. This seems the only candid explanation, however, and
is one which of course raises squarely the defensibility of capital punishment
itself.
The conclusion stated in the text, that in American society the recognizable
claim to avoidance of the death penalty is really the public's and not the
prisoner's, while perhaps startling, is easier to accept in view of the paucity
of reasons offered in support of the prisoner's case. Despite his intense interest in the problem and his enormous acuity, Mr. Justice Frankfurter could

come up with no more forceful arguments than those of the old commentators and the historical argument that the rule had always been so. He sought
recourse in an unsubstantiated and generalized contention that the due process
clause prohibits a state from taking the life of an insane person. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 19-21 (1950). But quaere, whether at root his
position, despite the general terms in which it is couched, is not essentially
the theological one. Thus in dissenting in Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S.
549, 559 (1958), he stated that it was better for a state to put up with unworthy claims of exemption than to "have on its conscience a single execution that would be barbaric because the victim was in fact, though he had
no opportunity to show it, mentally unfit to meet his destiny." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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must be offset by a punitive act of the same quality. Presumably killing an insane person does not have the same moral
quality as killing a sane one. Hence, it might be concluded that
it is improper to exact the death sentence when the prisoner is
insane, for then a punishment of lesser value is being imposed. The
retributive theory is also stated in another way, namely that the
prisoner's death is an expiation for his crime. Put into modern
psychological terms, this theory justifies the death penalty as a
vicarious punishment for crimes committed vicariously; punishment
gives the law-abiding a release. 9 For the psychological explanation
to have basis, however, the public must be able to identify with the
prisoner, and this they cannot do if he is insane. But, the rationale
based on the retributive theory, in its several variations, lasts only
so long as the prisoner remains insane. Once he recovers his sanity,
the reason for the rule disappears.
Another reason for the rule of exemption is essentially theological, namely that a person should not be put to death while
insane because in that condition he is unable to make his peace
with God. 20 This thinking seems at least implicit in the writings of
St. Thomas Aquinas. 21 The same point is memorably put by Shakespeare where he has Hamlet overtake his uncle while at prayer,
and decide not to work his vengeance then and send his uncle to
heaven, remembering that his father had been murdered "with all
his crimes broad blown":
Now might I do it pat, now he is praying;
And now I'll do't: and so he goes to heaven:
And so am I revenged. That would be scann'd"
A villain kills my father; and for that,
I, his sole son, do this same villain send
To heaven.
0, this is hire and salary, not revenge.
He took my father grossly, full of bread,
19

See

ZILBOORo,

(1954),

ZILBOORG,

20

Op.

OF

THE

cit. supra, at 76.

CRIMINAL

ACT

AND

SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY

PUNISHMENT

332 (954);

Probably in the psychoanalytic school there

are those who would put the proposition as baldly as this: we suspend execution while the prisoner is insane because the public would not be appeased
by such an execution (or even that the public would not enjoy it). One of
that school directed the authors' attention to Musselwhite v. State, 215 Miss.
363, 367, 60 So.2d 807, 809 (1952), where the court, discussing stay of
execution of the insane, said inter alia "[T]here is agreement among the
examining physicians that at the time of the hearing the petitioner had
lost awareness of his precarious situation. Amid the darkened mists of
mental collapse, there is no light against which the shadows of death may
be cast. It is revealed that if he were taken to the electric chair, he would
not quail or take account of its significance."
See Sir John Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11
STATE TRIALS

21

THE PSYCHOLOGY

reviewed in Louisell, 79 THE

474, 477 (Howell ed. 1816).

See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, First Part, Treatise on the Angels, ques.
64, art. 2, objection, reply to second objection; AquiNAs, SUMMA CONTRA
GENTILES,

bk. 3, ch. 146.
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With all his crime broad blown, as flush as May;
And how his audit stands who knows save heaven?
But in our circumstance and course of thought,
'Tis heavy with hirn: and am I then revenged,
To take him in the purging of his soul,
When he is fit and season'd for his passage?
No.
Up, sword, and know thou a more horridhent:
When he is drunk asleep, or in his rage,
Or in the incestuous pleasure of his bed;
At game, a-swearing, or about some act
That has no relish of salvation in't;
Then trip him, that his heels may kick at heaven
And that his soul may be as damn'd and black
As hell whereto it goes. My mother stars:
This physic but prolongs thy sickly days.22

This ground of exemption was much debated in England when
capital punishment was being reconsidered there, but no clear-cut
answer was forthcoming. On the one hand, it was argued that the
insane must be restored to sanity in order to make his peace; on
the other, it was urged by Archbishop William Temple that "It is
quite impossible to believe that eternal destiny depends in any degree
on the frame of mind you were in at the particular moment [of
death] rather than on the general tenor of the life.' ' 23 This accentuates the difficulty, in a society as theologically pluralistic as ours,
of appraising the significance of this ground as a reason for the rule

of exemption. Moreover, granting the validity of the ground, its
relationship to the procedural problem is perhaps so complex as to
be unmanageable. A human determination of sanity or insanity,
even after the most searching inquiry with modern psychiatric
techniques available, hardly rises to the level of moral certaintymany would call it only a prayerful guess. Whether capacity is
such as to permit true repentance is a question that ultimately is
for God alone.
There seems to be no other tenable explanations for the exemption rule.24 The most acceptable justification for the rule in Ameri22

22

24

SHAKESPEARE,

HAMLET,

PI~NcE

OF DENMARK, act III, sc. i"i, lines 72-96.

The story is told in GowERs, A LiiE FOR A LiFs? 44, 113 (1956). Quaere,
whether a right to exemption from execution while insane, on behalf of
one shown to be theologically committed while sane to the necessity of rationality at the hour of death so as to be able to make his peace, might ultimately
be held to inhere in the constitutional guarantee of the free exercise of religion. Cf. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory
flag salute unconstitutional when violative of child's religiously predicated
conscience). In Musselwhite v. State, 215 Miss. 363, 371, 60 So.2d 807, 811
(1952), in discussing stay of execution of the insane, the court said: "The
death warrant itself is a part of the judicial process. It is likewise a part
of due process that there be available to him [prisoner under death sentence] as a rational person avenues toward executive clemency, or even
spiritual consolation."
Recognized purposes of punishment, other than those mentioned in the text,

include reformation and incapacitation. Reformation is irrevelant in the
present context. When sane the prisoner will be executed; when insane he
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can society therefore is simply that it is unnecessary to put the
insane prisoner to death. The reason for putting him to death when
he recovers is to prevent feigned insanity as a means of escape from
the death penalty which society has felt it necessary to impose.
Inquiries beyond this point, to reiterate, involve attacks upon capital punishment itself. It seems evident that the uneasiness manifested in applying the insanity exemption is uneasiness over the
death penalty, which is so plainly put in issue in these insanity
proceedings. To the proceedings themselves we now turn.

II.

THE PROCEDURE FOR TRYING THE CLAIM OF EXEMPTION

The common law had no established procedure for trying a
claim that the defendant had become insane after conviction. The
issue was raised by a suggestion to the court, presumably by simple
motion. If the court thought the suggestion had enough merit to
warrant further inquiry, it could hold a preliminary hearing to
determine whether a prima facie case of insanity was made out.
The judge could then impanel a jury to try the issue. On the other
hand, it was apparently within his discretion to try the issue him25
self. As summed up in Nobles v. Georgia:
[B]y the common law, if, after conviction and sentence, a suggestion
of insanity was made, not that the judge to whom it was made should,
as a matter of right, proceed to summon a jury and have another
trial, but that
26 he should take such action as, in his discretion, he
deemed best.

The common law rule is still in effect in some states,2 7 but in
many others it has been supplemented or superseded by a statutory
procedure of various sorts. 2 8 The statutory procedures vary in their
provisions. 29 The variations occur in respect of both of the principal
procedural issues involved, namely who may raise the issue of the
prisoner's insanity and who shall decide the issue after it has been
raised. The first of these two issues is by far the more significant, and
is being cured, not so that he can go out into the community, but so that
he can go to the gas chamber. This hardly seems a meaningful basis for
reformation. Incapacitation is likewise irrelevant. Incapacitation means
safe-keeping, and the prisoner is for all practical purposes as fully incapacitated in a mental hospital as he is in death.
25

168 U.S. 398 (1897).

26 Id. at 407. For other statements of the common law rule, see Annot., 49
A.L.R. 804 (1927); WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 465.
27
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 27-28 (1949) (dissenting opinion); WIHOPEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 465.
28
See WmHioEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 465-66.
29 See WEIHOPEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 465-68. For the English procedure,
which involves an inquiry on the initiative of the Home Secretary, see
ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1949-1953) pp. 124129 (1953).
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involves two steps of inquiry: who is a proper party to raise the
issue and, if such a party raises the issue, is he entitled as a matter
of right to a hearing on his contention.
At common law, as we have seen, any person could raise the
issue by suggesting to the court that the prisoner had become insane.
Such is the rule by statute in many states. In some states, defendant's counsel or his next friend may raise the question. In practice,
all these devices seem to be the same, for the only person who normally will approach the court with a suggestion of defendant's insanity is his attorney, some member of his family or a friend. For
convenience, we may say that in these jurisdictions the defendant
has the right to raise the issue.
In the majority of states, the issue may be raised only by the
sheriff or warden having custody of the prisoner. In most states it
appears to be unsettled whether mandamus will lie against a warden
who is alleged to have wrongfully refused to initiate the inquiry. In
one state, it has been held that mandamus would lie for this purpose,
but the showing required was such that, for practical purposes, the
applicant for mandamus can compel a hearing only by making in
his application papers a prima facie case of insanity. 0
The second step is to inquire whether the person raising the
issue is entitled as a matter of right to a full hearing on the merits
of the issue. Under the statutes providing that the warden is the
proper person to raise the issue, the trial is held as a matter of course.
However, under the statutes providing that defendant can raise the
issue, it appears that nowhere is there a right to a trial as a matter
of course. On the contrary, in these jurisdictions a trial is held only
if the defendant accompanies his suggestion of insanity with prima
facie evidence of that fact. In practical effect, therefore, the issue
is tried only if the judge is shown reason to believe that the prisoner
is insane. 31
The second aspect of the hearing procedure is the mode of trial.
In the jurisdictions where the inquiry is initiated by the warden,
the trial is frequently conducted to a specially summoned jury in
an inquest at which the warden presides. In other jurisdictions, the
SD

31

See Shank v. Todhunter, 189 Ark. 881, 75 S.W.2d 382 (1934).
This result has been reached even where the statutory language rather
plainly attempted to give the prisoner a right to a trial. See Berger v. People,
123 Colo. 403, 231 P.2d 799 (1951). For cases applying statutes which grant
a plenary hearing only if the trial judge is satisfied that there is good cause
to make the inquiry, see e.g., Jackson v. United States, 25 F.2d 549 (D.C.
Cir. 1928). Cf. State v. Allen, 204 La. 513, 15 So.2d 870 (1943) (applying
the statutory procedure for determining sanity at the time of trial to the
case where insanity was claimed after conviction).
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warden merely applies to the appropriate trial court and the court
conducts the hearing. In jurisdictions where the inquiry is initiated
by suggestion to the court, the judge presides. The issue may be
tried to a jury or to the court; some states require jury trial, some
permit it, others are silent on the subject. Even in states where a
jury trial is not required, it appears to be the practice to have the
32
issue tried to a jury.
It is evident from the foregoing that no state confers a right
on the prisoner to have a trial of the issue of his present sanity.
Rather, the decision whether there will be a trial is vested either in
the warden or in the trial judge.
In California, the procedure for determining a prisoner's present insanity is set forth in California Penal Code sections 3700 to
3704. Section 3700 provides that the procedure contained in the
ensuing sections is exclusive.3 3 Section 3701 provides that if the
warden has "good reason to believe"3 4 that the prisoner is insane,
he shall cause a proceeding of inquiry to be commenced. The court
then summons a jury and conducts the trial. A verdict by threefourths of the jury is sufficient to determine the issue.3 5 If the jury
finds that defendant is insane, he is taken to the appropriate mental
hospital; if found sane, he is given over to the warden for execution 3 6
s2 The reason judges prefer not to try the issue is not necessarily the consequence of a belief that the jury is more competent to decide the question.
Perhaps judges prefer, understandably, to shift responsibility for the decision
to the collective shoulders of the jury.
33 Whether the exclusion of other procedures is constitutionally valid has been
much mooted in the courts. This problem is considered below in the discussion of the constitutional problems involved.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 3701 reads as follows: "If, after his delivery to the
warden for execution, there is good reason to believe that a defendant, under
judgment of death, has become insane, the warden must call such fact to
the attention of the district attorney of the county in which the prison is
situated, whose duty it is to immediately file . . . a petition . . .asking that
the question of his sanity be inquired into . . . ." On its face, this provision

8
36

suggests that the relation between the warden's custody and the appearance
of "good reason" is one of time, i.e., that the warden must act because the
"good reason" arises at the time the prisoner is in his custody. Hence, the
statute literally seems to mean that "good reason" is not what the warden
thinks is good reason, but what a court would think is good reason, at the
time the prisoner is in the warden's hands. This is perhaps a theoretical
quibble, but in a close case it might make a difference whether the question
was: "Does the warden think there is good reason?," rather than, "Do I,
the judge, think there is good reason?"
Whatever the apparent meaning of the statute, however, it seems fairly
clear that McCracken v. Teets, 41 Cal.2d 648, 262 P.2d 561 (1953), and
Caritativo v. Teets, 47 Cal.2d 304, 303 P.2d 339 (1956), interpreted it as
meaning that the warden must have good cause to believe defendant to be
insane. In effect, therefore, the test is one of the warden's good faith, not
the objective significance of the facts claimed to constitute the "good reason."
See People v. Riley, 37 Cal. 2d 510, 235 P.2d 381 (1951).
CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 3703, 3704.
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California Penal Code section 3702 has a provision which has
caused some difficulties. This section requires the district attorney
of the county where the prison is located (Marin County) to attend
the proceedings. It then goes on to provide that the district attorney
can subpoena witnesses "in the same manner as for witnesses to
attend before a grand jury." The meaning and purpose of this language are not clear. The California Supreme Court has taken it as
implying that the proceeding is ex parte, rather like the kind of
inquest made by a grand jury. As it said in People v. Riley:31
[T]he prescribed inquiry does not purport to be a true adversary
proceeding surrounded by all the safeguards and requirements of a
common-law jury trial ....

No provision is made for the assignment

of counsel or notice of hearing to the defendant, but only the district
attorney is required to attend the hearing. Pen. Code, sec. 3702.
Likewise, it is the district attorney who may produce witnesses ....
Such provisions-wherein no reference is made to any right of the
defendant to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses,
or to offer evidence-indicate a . . . procedure . . . akin to an ex
parte inquiry ... . .8

With all due respect to the supreme court, this seems a great
deal to read into section 3702. All that section says is that the district
attorney must attend and that he may subpoena witnesses. To be
sure, this manner of issuing subpoenas is like that in grand jury
proceedings, but it does not follow at all that other aspects of the
proceeding also resemble a grand jury proceeding. Bearing in mind
that the problem is one of statutory interpretation, it would seem
that there is little in the statutory language and apparently no legislative history to support the court's interpretation.
An interpretation at least equally plausible is that the hearing
is a special proceeding 3 and as such affords the prisoner all the
rights he has in an ordinary civil case. Among these are the right
to reasonable notice, the right to counsel (though perhaps not the
right to publicly compensated counsel, as in a criminal case), the
right to produce witnesses, by subpoena if necessary, and the right
to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Of course, the structure of
our civil procedure statutes is such that the foregoing procedural
37 37 Cal.2d 510, 235 P.2d 381 (1951).
as Id. at 515, 235 P.2d at 384.
39 People v. Lawson, 178 Cal. 722, 174 Pac. 885 (1918), had stated generally
that the insanity proceeding was a special proceeding. From this it could
be easily contended that the prisoner has the usual incidents of a civil trial,
viz., right to counsel, right to reasonable notice, right to cross-examine, etc.
However, in People v. Riley, 37 Cal.2d 510, 235 P.2d 381 (1951), the court
apparently overruled all these possibilities. Apparently this was done to
buttress the court's rejection of the prisoner's claim of a right to a trial on

his sanity. But, as suggested in the text, it is one thing to say that prisoner
has no right to have a trial; it is something else again to say that, if he is

to have a trial, it will nevertheless be merely an ex parte hearing. This is to
confuse the showing needed to get a trial with the trial itself.
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rights are inseparably connected with the right of appeal. It may
be suggested that the real reason for the language in the Riley case
was not a desire to deprive the prisoner of an effective hearing but
to forestall time-consuming appeals. This is quite another problem,
which could well be remedied by legislation.
Apart from the understandable desire to foreclose dilatory appeals, the court's approach in People v. Riley seems poor statutory
interpretation and poor public policy. Perhaps the warden should
be given the only key to the courthouse, but if he uses the key, there
is no reason at all why the ensuing trial should not be a full and
fair one.4 0 At any rate, the present interpretation of Penal Code
sections 3700-3704 is that the hearing is ex parte only. As indicated,
no appeal lies.
On the issue of restoration to sanity the procedural protections
afforded the prisoner are substantially greater. Whether a prisoner,
found insane in the manner described above, has been restored to
sanity is determined by the procedure set forth in Penal Code section 3704.41 In this hearing, defendant is required to be given written
notice of the hearing and counsel must be appointed for him. The
issue of restoration to sanity is tried to the court without a jury.
If restoration is found, the prisoner is delivered up for execution;
otherwise he is returned to the mental institution.
This, in brief, is the California procedure for trying the claim
of exemption. One anomaly is that the statutory procedure seems
to apply only to cases where the defendant is sentenced to death,
for section 3701 of the Penal Code refers only to that situation. It
has been noted above that the claim of insanity by prisoners under
sentences of less than death is largely academic, because in point

40

41

One may speculate on what the legislature intended in providing that the
district attorney may subpoena witnesses. It is possible that they reasoned
this way: The state is not a party; only parties may subpoena witnesses;
therefore, without special provision the state's interest cannot be protected
by compulsory process for witnesses; therefore, we should make such special
provision. The most accessible, though perhaps not the most suitable, model
for such a provision is to be found in the grand jury practice.
Prior to 1949, the statute provided that the fact of restoration is established
merely by the certificate of the superintendent of the mental hospital in
which the defendant is confined. It was under this prior procedure that the
prolonged Phyle litigation arose. After conviction Phyle had been found
insane by a jury and committed to a state mental hospital. There, he confessed that he had feigned his insanity. The superintendent promptly certified him to be sane. Phyle and his family fought this determination for the
next several years. See In re Phyle, 30 Cal.2d 838, 186 P.2d 134 (1947),
cert. dismissed, 334 U.S. 431 (1948); Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal.2d 144, 208
P.2d 668 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 895 (1949); Application of Phyle,
95 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. Cal. 1951). See generally, Comment, Execution of
Insane Persons, 23 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 246 (1950).
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of fact they rarely seem to urge the claim as a matter of legal right.4 2
Should such a claim be raised, however, no doubt the proper thing
to do would be to follow the common law procedure. 43
III.

THE

TEST OF INSANITY USED IN THE EXEMPTION CLAIM

It will be noticed that there has been no discussion of the test
of insanity used in connection with the exemption claim. On this
subject the common law was exceedingly vague and the California
statute is silent. Both have referred to the problem as simply one
of determining "insanity" without serious concern about definitions.
The sensitivity to the definitional problem developed in the recurring
debate over the M'Naghten rule's soundness makes it appropriate
that attention be paid to the definition used for purposes of the exemption claim. The meager authority indicates that the common
law test of insanity is whether the defendant is aware of the fact
that he has been convicted and that he is to be executed.44 Sometimes this is stated as whether he is "aware of the proceedings against
him." This is strikingly similar to the test used in connection with
the claim of insanity at the time of trial, and it is difficult not to
suspect that the test for the latter was simply carried over into the
exemption context.4 5 In any event, it is not at all clear that this is
an appropriate test.
The only considered discussion of the test that should be used
appears in a comment in the Southern California Law Review,48
which reads as follows:
42

See note 4 supra.
1367. CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.2 provides that the common law
shall be the rule of decision "so far as it is not repugnant to . . . the ...

485 CAL. PEN. CODE §

45

"

laws of this State." The common law remedy in the death penalty case
seems an apt analogy on which to invoke section 22.2. There also is authority
that a court has inherent power in inquiry into insanity in the death penalty
case, a power which would seem available in the non-capital cases as well.
See, e.g., State v. Davis, 6 Wash. 2d 696, 108 P.2d 641 (1940).
See Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 117 A.2d 96 (1955); cf. People
v. Field, 108 Cal. App.2d 496, 238 P.2d 1052 (1951); WEIHOPEN, op. Cit.
supra note 3, at 464. Compare the different definition offered in Bingham
v. State, 82 Okla. Crim. 305, 169 P.2d 311, 314 (1946): "Under the
common law the insanity that will preclude the execution means a state of
general insanity, the mental powers being wholly obliterated, and a being
in that deplorable condition can make no defense whatsoever and has no
understanding of the nature of the punishment about to be imposed."
Note that California Penal Code § 1367 runs the two together without any
indication that a separate test of insanity has been either intended or considered. See also WEOPEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 430-31, where the
author equates the problem of insanity at time of trial with that of insanity
at time of execution. It would seem that a test couched in terms of the
prisoner's "awareness" should also embrace the concepts of ability to consult
with counsel and to communicate important information.
Comment, Execution of Insane Persons, 23 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 246 (1950).
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If . . . punishment is an act of vengeance, then the prisoner's ability
to appreciate his impending fate would seem to be the standard.
. . . If the policy [underlying the exemption] is based on the right
of the defendant to make his peace with God, then a realization of
his original guilt should be added to the test. If the reason is that
he should have an opportunity to suggest items in extenuation or
make arguments for executive clemency, then the standard should
probably involve intelligence factors as well as moral awareness.' 7

Implicit in this analysis is that the test of insanity to be used
Should depend on the purpose of punishment. The purpose of the
exemption and its relation to the objectives of punishment have
already been explored above. It will be recalled that the conclusion
reached there was that the exemption could not be successfully linked
to any of the bases of punishment, but is explainable only as a
means of avoiding the unnecessary taking of life. If this is true, then
the appropriate test of insanity to be used is one which is broad
enough to allow maximum exemptions and yet narrow enough to
prevent feigning of insanity. Such a test, it would appear, would be
simply whether the defendant's condition is such that, by ordinary
standards, he would be involuntarily committable to an institution.
This standard can hardly be thought too broad, for it is the basis
we presently use for involuntary treatment of mental illness. Its
familiarity to the courts and psychiatrists should reduce to a minimum the opportunities for deception. Finally, since it stays within
the realm of medical discourse, it does not involve the conceptual
and practical problems which arise when, as in M'Naghten, an attempt is made to define insanity in a way that is significant legally
but discordant with prevailing medical thought. 8
There seem to be no serious difficulties arising from application
of such a test. The matter appears to be wholly within the legislature's discretion, for, as we shall see, such constitutional problems
as there are have been procedural and not substantive. To those
problems we now give consideration.

47

Id. at 256.

48

It is difficult to know how a psychiatrist would go about applying the test
stated by the Oklahoma court, supra note 44. It is also difficult to know how

a psychiatrist would have any less trouble with the common law test, "underderstanding the proceedings against him,"

M'Naghten rule.

than he now does with the

The law would probably be well advised to avoid the

M'Naghten sort of thicket, if at all possible.

The test used in England is the one suggested in the text, namely
whether the defendant is certifiable as insane. See RoYAL CoMMIssir oNr
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1949-1953) 101, 124 (1953).
Compare Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 117 A.2d 96 (1955): The
test is whether defendant's "capacity to use his customary self-control, judgment and discretion had .

. .

been so lessened that it was necessary or advis-

able for him to be under care." Id. at 29, 117 A.d at 102.
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CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN HEARINGS ON
EXEMPTION CLAIMS

The constitutional problem involved in the exemption rule is
whether the due process clause imposes any obligation on the states
to grant a hearing on a prisoner's claim of insanity, and, if so, what
kind of hearing. The question was posed for the first time a half
century ago in Nobles v. Georgia.49 There, the defendant had been
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The Georgia statute
provided that the insanity issue was determined by a jury inquest
conducted by and on the initiative of the warden or sheriff having
custody of the defendant. Defendant asserted a right to have her
claim heard by a jury.
The Supreme Court upheld the state court's dismissal of defendant's petition for a hearing. The Court said that a jury trial
was unnecessary. Whether its decision is any broader than this has
been disputed. The reasoning used makes it clear that the state need
do no more than impose responsibility on some appropriate official
to conduct an inquiry into defendant's sanity when it seems to be
necessary or appropriate. This result appears to be the necessary
implication of the reductio argument used by the Court, as follows:
If it were true that at common law a suggestion of insanity after
sentence, created on the part of the convict an absolute right to a
trial of this issue by a judge and jury, then (as a finding that insanity did not exist at one time would not be the thing adjudged as to
its non-existence at another) it would be wholly at the will of a
convict to suffer any punishment whatsoever, for the necessity of
his doing so would depend solely upon his fecundity in making suggestion after suggestion of insanity, to be followed by trial upon
trial.50

It will be seen that the force of this argument is quite unaffected
by the nature of the hearing conducted, whether it be jury trial,
trial to the court alone or administrative determination. The argument is directed against the right to a hearing of any kind, and it
is not unduly latitudinarian to read the Nobles case as deciding that
there is indeed no such right.
Whatever the scope of the Nobles decision, it apparently stifled
constitutional objections to exemption procedures for fifty years. In
the meantime, California adopted its present procedure for trying
the issue. It is worthy of note that from the statute's adoption in

168 U.S. 398 (1897).
5o

Id. at 405-06.
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1905 to 1947, the warden's discretion had gone unchallenged.5 1 In
1947, the Phyle litigation got under way. For procedural reasons
Phyle never succeeded in getting the United States Supreme Court
to decide his claim that he had a right to a hearing on the issue of
his present sanity.,5 The decisive test of the constitutional issue came
up shortly afterward, however, in the case of Solesbee v. Balkcom.63
The Solesbee case was a habeas corpus proceeding on behalf of
a convicted Georgia murderer claiming present insanity. Under the
then prevailing Georgia procedure, that issue was determined ex
parte by the Governor of the state. It was contended that the prisoner
had a right to have his sanity determined by a "judicial or administrative tribunal after notice and hearing in which he could be
represented by counsel, cross-examine witnesses and offer evidence.1 54 With only Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting, the Supreme
Court rejected this contention, stating that the mode of procedural
effectuation of exemption for insanity was a matter of grace, not
of right, and that accordingly the state was under no obligation to
provide a hearing. The court said that the Nobles case stands for the
proposition that "the tribunal charged with responsibility must be
vested with broad discretion in deciding whether evidence shall be
heard." 55
The Solesbee case seemed to have been dispositive of any objec51 See Post-Conviction Remedies in California Death Penalty Cases, 11 STAN.
L. REv. 94, 131 (1958). See also People v. Sloper, 198 Cal. 601, 246 Pac.
802 (1926) (the courts have no jurisdiction to pass on the insanity issue
except in a proceeding initiated by the warden pursuant to Penal Code
sections 3700-04). For the statutory history prior to 1905, see In re Phyle,
30 Cal.2d 838, 846, 186 P.2d 134, 139 (1947).
52 See note 41 supra. After Phyle had been returned from the mental hospital
to prison, he brought habeas corpus claiming that he had a right to a
hearing on his restoration to sanity, that returning him to prison without
such a hearing was a denial of due process and therefore that his detention
in prison was invalid. The California Supreme Court rejected this claim on
the ground that the courts had no authority to inquire into the prisoner's
sanity except in a proceeding initiated by the warden. It accordingly dismissed the petition. In re Phyle, 30 Cal.2d 838, 186 P.2d 134 (1947).
Phyle appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, but that
court dismissed because it was advised that Phyle should have presented
his claim by means of mandamus rather than habeas corpus. Phyle v. Duffy,
334 U.S. 431 (1948). Mandamus was thereupon brought on Phyle's behalf.
The California Supreme Court treated the question as properly presented
in this manner and, on the merits, affirmed the trial judge's determination
that there was no "good reason" to suppose Phyle to be insane and hence
there should be no plenary trial of the issue. Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal.2d 144,
208 P.2d 668 (1949). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
338 U.S. 895 (1949). The disposition by the Supreme Court was such, however, as clearly to imply that the prisoner had a constitutional right to a
hearing on his claim. See 47 MicH. L. Rv. 707 (1949).
- 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
54
Id. at 10.
55 Id. at 13.
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tions to the California procedure. That procedure was nevertheless
challenged shortly thereafter in Caritativo v. Teets. 86 In that case,
the California Supreme Court held that, in the light of Penal Code
section 3700, the courts had no jurisdiction to inquire into the
prisoner's insanity except in a proceeding initiated by the warden
pursuant to Penal Code sections 3701-3704. It expressly disapproved
suggestions to the contrary in Phyle v. Duffy.5 In a per curiam
opinion, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, citing the Solesbee case,58 but this time, three justices dissented. Mr. Justice Harlan
concurred in an opinion in which he treated the California statute
as imposing on the warden "a mandatory duty to make a continuing
check on the mental condition of condemned prisoners and to notify
the district attorney whenever he finds grounds for belief that a
prisoner has become insane." 5 The exercise of this duty, said Mr.
Justice Harlan, had to be "responsible and [in] good-faith." 60
In dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter urged that the warden's good
faith was impugned by the fact that he had refused to allow an outside psychiatrist to examine the prisoner and had refused to allow
counsel to inspect the prison's psychiatric records. Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not urge that a judicial hearing should be required nor
that the warden was necessarily an inappropriate officer to make the
preliminary determination of whether a plenary hearing should be
held. But he said:
I do insist on the mandatory requirement that some procedure be
established for assuring that the warden give ear to a claim that
the circumstances warrant his submission of the issue of sanity to
a determination in61 accordance with the procedure set forth in the
California statutes.

He went on to reiterate his point, that the due process clause gives
the prisoner a right to be heard by the warden on the issue whether
there is "good cause" to believe him to be insane.
The foregoing is the present posture of the constitutional law
on the problem. In view of divisions in the Supreme Court and the
charged character of the issue involved, it cannot be said with assurance that the constitutional issue has been put to rest. But taking due account of the difficulties of forecasting constitutional decisions, it would appear that California's present procedure will survive any foreseeable challenge. Of course, any procedure involving
5
57
5

5
60
61

47 Cal.2d 304, 303 P.2d 339 (1956).
34 Cal.2d 144, 208 P.2d 668 (1949). See notes 41 and 52 supra.
Caritativo v. Teets, 47 Cal.2d 304, 303 P.2d 339 (1956), afld sub. nom.
Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1950).
357 U.S. at 650.
Id. at 551.
id. at 557.
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greater procedural protection to the prisoner would also satisfy the
requirements of due process.6 2 It is, however, difficult to know what
procedure would satisfy Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and yet also avoid
interminable delay. This, as the Supreme Court recognized in the
Nobles case, is the real objection to broadening the procedural remedies available to a prisoner claiming the insanity exemption. This
practical problem deserves elaboration.

V.

THE PRACTICAL DILEMMA INVOLVED IN
LIBERALIZING THE PROCEDURE

The recent broadening of the constitutional protections afforded
criminal defendants is well known. Equally well known is the almost limitless resourcefulness of prisoners in resurrecting (and sometimes simply erecting) new reasons why their imprisonment is a
deprivation of due process.6 3 Because the courts, and especially the
United States Supreme Court, are properly reluctant to close the door
to a prisoner claiming his rights have been violated, the prosecution
is rarely able to say that all possible objections to a conviction have
been put to rest. So the recent habeas corpus cases demonstrate that
the fear of interminable litigation in insanity claims is not an idle
one.
But the case of the claimed insanity exemption is more difficult
than the typical habeas corpus case. However long the habeas corpus
struggle may last, it normally turns on the issues presented by the
original conviction. With perhaps a rare exception, no new events
occur to create new issues, so there is the theoretical and real possibility that some day the litigation will come to an end. This is
62

63

In the California Supreme Court's decision in the Caritativo case, Mr. Justice Schauer concurred in the judgment, but stated that he believed the
prisoner could raise the issue of his insanity by means of habeas corpus. The
import of Mr. Justice Schauer's opinion is that the legislature has no right
to foreclose such an inquiry because the California Constitution provides that
the privilege of the writ may not be suspended. But this assumes that the
constitutional guarantee of the writ is as broad as the practice under it. Put
another way, this assumes that our constitution guarantees a hearing of all
the various types of issues which have been heard under habeas corpus.
But it has been demonstrated that a common law habeas corpus did not lie to
question the imprisonment of a man convicted by a court of record. And it
has been forcefully urged that this historical content of the writ is all that
the constitution guarantees. See Collings, Habeas Corpus for ConvictsConstitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CALiF. L. REv. 335 (1952).
See also In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 122 P.2d 22 (1942). As a matter of
policy, of course, it may be wise generally to permit a broad scope of inquiry
under habeas corpus, but this is another problem. See Sunal v. Large, 332
U.S. 174, 184 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See generally, Post-Conviction Remedies in California Death Penalty Cases,

11

STAN.

L. Rv. 94 (1958).
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not true, however, in the case of the insanity exemption. By definition, the exemption applies at the time of execution. Obviously, the
determination of sanity has to be made before execution. Therefore,
the determination of sanity can never be made as of the time that
it becomes legally relevant. Hence, the legal issue required to be decided-insanity at the precise moment of execution-literally can
never be determined.
The practical problem thus posed cannot be avoided; it is inherent in the statement of the legal rule. Yet no revision of the legal
rule is feasible, for a rule that stipulated "No person shall be executed who is insane 10 days before the date of his execution" would
probably be meaningless and certainly purposeless, as it would only
change the date of encounter with the dilemma. This practical difficulty has been repeatedly recognized by the courts and has been
summed up as follows: "Some unreviewable discretion must ultimately be permitted the executing officer.""
None of the judges who have held out for a right to some sort
of hearing on the claim of insanity seem to have faced up to this
difficulty. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has stated that "claims obviously
frivolous need of course not be heard,"' ' 5 yet he also tells us that without a hearing it cannot be said that a claim is frivolous."6 Perhaps
Mr. Justice Frankfurter would concede that no new hearing need
be given to a prisoner whose claim has just been rejected. But "just"
rejected may mean, with appellate review, six months to two years
before, and it surely cannot be said that insanity could not supervene in that interval.67 Hence, if we are to avoid indefinite procedural regression, we must fall back either on unfettered administrative discretion, or on a type of control and review thereof different from that which normally prevails in criminal and civil legal
administration.

64

65

Comment, Execution of Insane Persons, 23 So. CAL. L. REv. 246, 252 (1950).
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 25 (1950) (dissenting opinion).

66 Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 558 (1958) (dissenting opinion). Mr.
Justice Frankfurter treats the problem as though it were one of undue delay,
apparently without recognizing that the problem is not undue delay but indefinite delay. He also says that "The protection of a constitutional right to
life ought not to be subordinated to the fear that some lawyers will be wanting
in the observance of their professional responsibilities." Ibid. But the prisoner can act as his own attorney and, as has been so fully demonstrated,
do very nicely at it. And if the prisoner has a right to counsel, he has a

right to counsel willing to serve.

67

Strictly speaking, of course, the insanity can supervene if there is, as there
must be, any interval at all between determination of sanity and execution.
The point thus holds theoretically no matter how speedy the procedure. It
is not clear how short the interval must be to be treated as de minimis.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

To recognize candidly the dilemma inherent in procedural effectuation of the rule that the insane shall not be executed is not
to say that California is doing as well as it should and can do. Nor
is compliance with due process-assuming that the Supreme Court
would continue to hold that California's procedure does complyper se the ideal for which we should strive. A draft of a proposal to
replace the existing statutory scheme is set forth in the Appendix.
We have tried to provide procedural protection both commensurate
with our society's aversion to execution of the insane and consistent
with the need to avoid interminable delay.
The essence of our proposal is to recognize the obligation in the
warden"B to avoid execution of the insane; to require him to have an
examination made of the prisoner; to accord the prisoner or his representative a right to have his experts participate; and to enforce
these procedural requirements by mandate. Further, the warden's
determination of sanity can be set aside on mandate but only if it
is not supported by substantial evidence. A jury trial may once be
had on demand of the prisoner, provided a showing is made that a
triable issue exists; but at the trial the issue is simply whether the
warden's determination of sanity was based on substantial evidence.
Neither court nor jury is to arrogate the deciding power of the warden, but only to make sure that he exercises it in accordance with
prescribed procedure and on the basis of substantial evidence.
This seems to us about the best that can be done.

APPENDIX

Note: In order to simplify, we set forth below our proposal not
in terms of the amending statute itself, but in terms of the California
Penal Code sections as they would exist were our proposal adopted.
What follows would be achieved by slightly amending existing section 3700; repealing existing sections 3701, 3702 and 3703; substantially amending section 3704; and adding new sections 3701.1,
3701.2, 3701.3 and 3701.4.
Section 3700.
No judge, court, or officer, other than the Governor, can suspend
the execution of a judgment of death, except the warden of the State
prison to whom the defendant is delivered for execution, as provided
s See Post-Conviction Remedies in California Death Penalty Cases, 11
L. REv. 94, 132 (1958).

HeinOnline -- 9 UCLA L. Rev. 401 1962

STAN.

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:381

in the seven succeeding sections,* unless an appeal is taken.
Section 3701.1.
(a) The warden to whom a defendant under judgment of death
has been delivered for execution shall make an inquiry into the
mental condition of the defendant. Promptly after receipt of the defendant, and in any event no later than 30 days prior to the date
set for execution, the warden shall have him examined by one or
more psychiatrists designated by the warden. Not later than 15 days
prior to the date set for execution, the psychiatrist or psychiatrists
making the examination shall make a written report of their findings
to the warden. The warden may require supplementary examinations
of the defendant at any time prior to execution. The report of any
such supplementary examination made more than five days prior
to the date set for execution shall be in writing.
(b) The defendant or any person on his behalf may deliver to
the warden not later than 15 days prior to the date set for execution
a written demand that the prisoner's mental condition be examined
by not more than three psychiatrists designated by or on behalf of
the defendant. The demand shall contain the names of the examining psychiatrists and the time, not later than 15 days prior to the
date set for execution, at which it is requested that the examination
be conducted. The warden shall grant such request, but may require
that the examination be conducted at some reasonable time other
than that designated. The examination shall be conducted at such
place and for such reasonable period as the warden may require.
The examining psychiatrists shall, not later than 10 days prior to
the date set for execution, deliver to the warden a written report
of their findings.
(c) Copies of the reports of examinations made pursuant to
subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section shall be made available,
upon reasonable demand, to the defendant and anyone acting in his
behalf.
Section 3701.2.
(a) The warden shall receive the reports mentioned in section
3701.1 and, in addition, shall receive any further evidence concerning the defendant's sanity which may be submitted to him by or
on behalf of the defendant not later than 10 days prior to the date
set for execution. The warden shall give due consideration to such
reports and such evidence, if any, and shall determine whether the
defendant is insane.
*The seven sections referred to include those that follow and those pertaining
to suspected pregnancy, not relevant to this study.
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(b) If the warden determines that the defendant is insane, he
shall make a written finding to that effect. He shall thereupon suspend the execution and transmit a copy of his finding to the Governor, and deliver the defendant, together with a copy of his finding,
to the medical superintendent of an appropriate state facility for
the insane. If the warden determines that the defendant is not insane, he shall make a written finding to that effect. The finding
shall be made not later than five days prior to the date set for execution. A copy of the finding shall promptly be given to the defendant
and notice that the finding has been made shall be given to any
person who has acted in behalf of the defendant in regard to the
determination of his sanity. The warden's finding shall be subject
to judicial review only as provided in section 3701.3.
Section 3701.3.
(a) If the warden determines that the defendant is not insane,
the defendant or someone acting on his behalf may obtain a writ
of mandate from the Superior Court in and for the county in which
the prison is situated requiring the warden to suspend execution by
showing to the Court:
1. That the warden has not followed the procedure prescribed
in sections 3701.1 and 3701.2 or that the reports and other evidence,
if any, submitted to the warden establish that the warden's determination of sanity is not supported by substantial evidence; and
2. That the defendant and those acting on his behalf acted with
due diligence and dispatch in presenting the question of the defendant's sanity.
(b) The district attorney of the county in which the prison is
located shall represent the warden in any such proceeding. The defendant shall be entitled to be represented by counsel.
(c) If the trial court finds that the warden has failed to comply
with the procedure prescribed in sections 3701.1 and 3701.2, it shall
issue a writ of mandate directing the warden to suspend execution
and to proceed with a proper determination, or redetermination as
the case may be, of defendant's sanity.
(d) If the trial court finds that the warden's determination of
sanity is not supported by substantial evidence, the court shall issue
a writ of mandate directing the warden to suspend execution, and directing that the defendant be taken to a state hospital for the insane,
and there kept in safe confinement until his reason is restored.
Upon demand of the defendant, or upon order of the trial court
entered on its own initiative, the issue of whether the warden's de-
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termination of sanity is supported by substantial evidence, shall be
tried to a jury of 12 persons, summoned and impaneled from the
regular jury list of the county in which the prison is situated; but
the defendant shall be entitled to have only one jury trial of the
issue. The district attorney, and the defendant and those acting on
his behalf, shall have compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses. The warden's determination shall not be set aside under this
subsection (d) except upon a finding that it is not supported by
substantial evidence, and when the trial is by jury the verdict so
finding must be concurred in by not less than three-fourths of the
jury. The verdict of the jury must be entered upon the minutes.
(e) Unless the writ of mandate is required by reason of the
provisions of this section, the court shall deny the application for
the writ.
(f) No appeal shall lie from, nor any other appellate review be
obtainable of, an order denying the application for the writ of mandate unless the judge hearing the application for the writ states in
his order of denial that a question of law or fact is presented of such
substance that an appeal is justified, or unless the Supreme Court
of this state by order grants an appellate hearing. In such event, the
court may order an appropriate suspension of execution pending
determination of the appeal.
Section 3701.4.
For the purpose of determining whether a person under judgment of death is insane such that he may not be executed, as provided in sections 1367 and 3701.1 to 3701.3, "insane" means mentally ill as that term is defined in section 5040 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
Section 3704.
When a defendant who has been delivered to a state hospital
for the insane, as provided in section 3701.2 or section 3701.3, recovers his sanity the superintendent of such hospital shall certify
that fact to the judge of the superior court in and for the county in
which is located the prison to which the defendant was originally
delivered for execution, who must thereupon fix a date upon which,
after ten days' written notice to the defendant and the district attorney of the county from which the defendant was originally sentenced and the district attorney of the county in which is located the
prison to which the defendant was originally delivered, a hearing
shall be had before said judge sitting without a jury to determine
whether or not the defendant has in fact recovered his sanity. If the
defendant appears without counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to

HeinOnline -- 9 UCLA L. Rev. 404 1962

1962]

STAY OF EXECUTION

405

represent him at said hearing. If the judge should determine that the
defendant has recovered his sanity he must certify that fact to the
Governor, who must thereupon issue to the warden his warrant appointing a day for the execution of the judgment, and the warden
shall thereupon return the defendant to the state prison pending the
execution of the judgment. If, however, the judge should determine
that the defendant has not recovered his sanity he shall direct the
return of the defendant to a state hospital for the insane, to be there
kept in safe confinement until his sanity is restored.
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